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proceedings is the determination of a proper interest rate that debtors must
pay on secured claims existing at the time of a bankruptcy reorganization.
For decades, the courts of appeals have debated the proper cramdown
determination approach. In Till v. SCS Credit Corp., the Supreme Court
addressed the issue in a Chapter 13 context and produced a plurality
opinion endorsing a formula approach. However, there is not yet a
consensus for Chapter 11 cases. This Comment argues for the adoption of a
“contract rate” approach whereby courts will default to the prepetition
contract rate of the secured claim. I believe this method adequately protects
the creditor’s lending expectations while also helping to limit the debtor-inpossession’s evidentiary costs. Unlike the other approaches, the contract
rate approach is more objective; courts will no longer have to consider
evidential material to make a determination of the appropriate risk
premiums or the existence of an “efficient market.” More importantly, the
contract rate approach will provide predictability and greater fairness by
ensuring that similar cases are treated alike. Overall, the ease, simplicity,
and fairness of the contract rate approach make it a better option.
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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy law in the United States offers benefits to both debtors and
creditors. Debtors are able to exit bankruptcy with a fresh start, while
creditors generally get at least a portion of their money back.1 Ideally,
bankruptcy provides a quick and orderly forum for debtors to pay creditors
1

See Saul P. Levmore, Fables, Sagas, and Laws, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 485, 488–89 (1997)
(describing the “fresh start” policy behind bankruptcy law); see also Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.,
236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915) (contending that the purpose of bankruptcy law is to provide the debtor
with a fresh start); In re Sullivan, 195 B.R. 649, 654 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) (asserting that a “fresh
start” for the debtor is “the essence of modern bankruptcy law” and one of its “primary purposes”
(quoting In re Willis, 189 B.R. 203, 205 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1995))). Of course, this debtor-focused
purpose is balanced against another important interest advanced by the bankruptcy system: providing
recovery for creditors. See Michael Bentley Guss, Comment, Ohio v. Kovacs: The Conflict Between
Federal Bankruptcy Laws and State Environmental Regulations, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1263, 1269 (1985)
(“[T]he creditors will receive at least part of the debt owed to them.”).
So who can be a debtor in bankruptcy? Precedents reveal that debtors in bankruptcy include “mom
and pop” businesses, movie and pop stars, politicians, airlines, large investment banks, car
manufacturers, etc.—the list is endless. See, e.g., In re Tex. Rangers Baseball Partners, 434 B.R. 393
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) (describing the bankruptcy filing of the owners of the Texas Rangers).
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and resolve their debts. Yet, in reality, many bankruptcies are drawn into
long and expensive litigation. One of the most frequently argued economic
issues in bankruptcy court is the proper interest rate that debtors must pay
on secured claims existing at the time of a bankruptcy reorganization.2
When the parties to the bankruptcy proceeding fail to settle upon an interest
rate, the bankruptcy judge must determine and calculate an appropriate
cramdown interest rate.
Due to the tremendous financial impact a cramdown can have on all
parties, cramdown interest rates have become “one of the most litigated,
contentious and costly squabbles in the bankruptcy arena.”3 The existence
of cramdown interest rates stems from the bankruptcy court’s “cramdown”
power, which is the court’s ability to confirm the reorganization plan
proposed by a debtor-in-possession4 despite the objections of creditors.5 The
judicial determination of this cramdown interest rate is often a decision that
has significant financial ramifications both for the debtor-in-possession and
for creditors.6 The cramdown interest rate may determine whether a
reorganization plan is feasible, and it is certainly a key factor that secured
creditors consider when deciding whether or not to accept a proposed
reorganization plan. Yet, oddly enough, despite the large number of Chapter
11 bankruptcies each year7 and the need for predictability and certainty,
2

See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV.
1061, 1119 (1985) (“Few bankruptcy issues have met with as much confusion as the determination of a
proper discount rate.”).
“[A] ‘secured claim’ is a right to payment that can be enforced either against property in which the
debtor has an interest or against a claim of the debtor that is subject to setoff.” Eugene R. Wedoff, The
Treatment of Claims in Consumer Bankruptcies 3 (1999), http://www.ilnb.uscourts.gov/Judge/Wedoff/
Outlines/Treatment_of_Claims.pdf.
3
C.B. Reehl & Stephen P. Milner, Cram-Down Interest Rates: The Quest Continues, 30 CAL.
BANKR. J. 15, 19 (2009); see Jason A. Pill, UnTill the Footnote Was Written: The Effect of Till v. SCS
Credit Corporation on 11 U.S.C. § 1129(B)(2), 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 267, 268 (2010).
4
Upon the filing of a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 or, in the context of an
involuntary case, upon the entry of an order for relief, the debtor automatically assumes an identity as
“debtor in possession.” 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2006).
The debtor-in-possession keeps possession and control of its assets while undergoing reorganization
under Chapter 11. Debtor-in-possession status ends when a plan of reorganization is confirmed, the
bankruptcy case is dismissed or converted, or a Chapter 11 trustee is appointed. See § 1104(a)
(describing the relatively limited circumstances in which a trustee may be appointed to manage the
debtor’s affairs); §§ 1107–1108 (describing the rights and powers of the debtor-in-possession).
5
Chapter 11 grants “cramdown” powers to the bankruptcy court. See § 1129(b)(1).
6
See Monica Hartman, Comment, Selecting the Correct Cramdown Interest Rate in Chapter 11 and
Chapter 13 Bankruptcies, 47 UCLA L. REV. 521, 522 (1999) (“The interest rate that debtors must pay
on claims existing at the time of a bankruptcy reorganization is arguably the most debated economic
issue in bankruptcy litigation.”).
7
See Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by Year (1980-2011), AM. BANKR. INST., http://
www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=65139&TEMPLATE=/CM/
ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited May 5, 2012) (presenting bankruptcy filing statistics from 1980 to
2011).
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bankruptcy courts continue to struggle with the proper determination of the
cramdown interest rate a debtor-in-possession must pay on secured claims.
For decades, the courts of appeals have debated the proper approach to
determining cramdown rates.8 In Till v. SCS Credit Corp.,9 a 2004 case, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue and produced a plurality opinion
endorsing a formula approach.10 Yet because Till failed to produce a
majority opinion and involved cramdown rates in the Chapter 13 context,11
the extent of its precedential value in Chapter 11 cases is limited.
Ultimately, Till has left practitioners and courts with little guidance as to the
proper method of determining Chapter 11 cramdown interest rates.12 Recent
developments suggest several cramdown approaches are being applied to
Chapter 11 cases, such as the efficient market and formula approaches;
however, none yet commands a clear consensus.
After reviewing the various methods for determining cramdown rates,
this Comment argues for the adoption of a contract rate approach. Under the
contract rate approach, courts will default to the contract rate of the secured
claim. This method will serve the interests of both the debtor-in-possession
and the creditor better than the approaches that are currently being used
because it adequately protects the creditor’s lending expectations while also
helping to limit the debtor-in-possession’s evidentiary costs. Unlike the
other approaches, the contract rate approach is objective; courts will no
longer have to consider evidentiary material to make a determination of the
appropriate risk premiums or the existence of an efficient market.13 More
importantly, the contract rate approach will provide predictability and
greater fairness by ensuring that similar cases are treated alike. Overall, the
ease, simplicity, and fairness of the contract rate approach make it a better
option.
Part I reviews the legal background of the bankruptcy court and
Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Part II discusses the importance of cramdown
interest rates and examines the judicial approaches employed prior to Till.
8

See April E. Kight, Recent Development, Balancing the Till: Finding the Appropriate Cram Down
Rate in Bankruptcy Reorganizations After Till v. SCS Credit Corporation, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1015, 1015
(2005).
9
541 U.S. 465 (2004).
10
See infra Part III.
11
Unless otherwise indicated, all code, chapter, section, and rule references are to the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006), and the FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001–9037.
12
A Chapter 11 debtor may also be an individual and not necessarily a corporation. However, for
the purposes of this Comment, I will narrow the scope of Chapter 11 debtors to corporations or other
business entities. In the Chapter 11 individual-debtor context, it may make sense for the courts to follow
the approach adopted by Till’s plurality. The rationale for this lies in the inherent differences between
individuals and corporations.
13
For examples of the efficient market approach (and its concomitant interpretive difficulties), see
Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient, Inc.), 420 F.3d
559 (6th Cir. 2005), and In re Nw. Timberline Enters., Inc., 348 B.R. 412 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
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Part III analyzes the cramdown controversy and the impact of Till on
Chapter 11 cases. It also discusses the precedential value of Till and
concludes that it is instructive for Chapter 11 bankruptcies but not binding
on lower courts. Part IV examines the efficient market approach and its
connection with debtor-in-possession financing. It explains why and
concludes that debtor-in-possession financing cannot equate to an “efficient
market” for cramdown purposes. Finally, Part V proposes the contract rate
approach for determining cramdown interest rates in Chapter 11
bankruptcies. It explains why a contract rate approach is preferable to other
approaches that courts have adopted.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY
Pursuant to its constitutional power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,” Congress has
established a federal bankruptcy system.14 Although a negative stigma has
been attached to bankruptcy, the current American bankruptcy system
offers benefits to both debtors and creditors by offering relief to debtors
while protecting the interest of creditors.
In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act,15 a
comprehensive piece of bankruptcy legislation that continues to serve as the
uniform federal law governing all bankruptcy cases in the United States.
One of the most notable features of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act was
the creation of a strong business reorganization section in Chapter 11 that
dealt with how businesses file a bankruptcy petition and reorganize.
The goal of any Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to “strike a balance between
the need of a corporate debtor in financial hardship to be made
economically sound and the desire to preserve creditors’ and stockholders’
existing legal rights to the greatest extent possible.”16 In effect, a Chapter 11
bankruptcy embodies a policy that favors enabling “a debtor to continue to
operate and to reorganize or sell its business as a going concern rather than
simply to liquidate a troubled business.”17 It is thought that continuing to
14

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
and 28 U.S.C.).
16
See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01, at 1100-4 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2009); see also Edward H. Levi & James Wm. Moore, Bankruptcy and Reorganization: A
Survey of Changes. III, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 398, 405 (1938) (“The problem of reorganization is primarily a
problem of how a failing debtor may be made economically sound and at the same time the rights,
insofar as they exist, of the creditors and stockholders be preserved under a fair arrangement.”).
17
7 COLLIER, supra note 16. By comparison, in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the business ceases
operations and a trustee is appointed to sell all of its assets. The proceeds are then distributed to its
creditors with any residual amount returned to shareholders and owners. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 16,
¶ 700.01 (2010).
Under Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor remains in control of day-to-day business operations as a
debtor-in-possession and files a repayment plan with the bankruptcy court. A debtor-in-possession is
15
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operate can generate greater value than liquidating the company.18 The
bankrupt company hopes to emerge from bankruptcy with a new capital
structure that will put behind it the economic woes that brought the
company into bankruptcy in the first place.
Under Chapter 11, a debtor-in-possession must file a repayment plan
with the bankruptcy court and solicit creditors for acceptance and
confirmation.19 If the court accepts and confirms the plan, the debtor will
continue to operate and pay its debts under the terms of the repayment plan.
In many instances, however, reorganizations will not proceed so smoothly
due to creditors’ refusal to assent to the repayment plan. Congress, in
drafting the Bankruptcy Code, anticipated this issue and created § 1129(b)
to allow nonconsensual confirmation of a repayment plan. If the
requirements of § 1129(b) are met, the court can confirm the plan despite
creditors’ objections; essentially, the repayment plan is “crammed down”
upon the nonassenting creditors.20
II. CRAMDOWN INTEREST RATE AND METHODS OF CRAMDOWN
DETERMINATION
“Cramdown” is a bankruptcy term used to describe the judicial power
to confirm or modify a plan against the wishes of certain classes of interest
or claim holders.21 It is a powerful tool that allows the bankruptcy court to
force dissenting classes of creditors, including those with both secured and
unsecured claims, to accept the plan. Under a cramdown, the “dissenting
classes are compelled to rely on difficult judicial valuations, judgments, and

offered considerable discretion regarding the business’ operation, constrained generally only by the
business judgment rule. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107‒1108 (2006) (establishing that a debtor is given the rights
and powers of a Chapter 11 trustee). In the plan process, creditors may propose their own bankruptcy
plan once the debtor’s exclusivity period has expired. See § 1121(c); discussion infra Part II.
18
7 COLLIER, supra note 16 (“Continued operation may enable the debtor to preserve any positive
difference between the going concern value of the business and the liquidation value.”).
19
See § 1129(a). The debtor-in-possession must also satisfy certain requirements regarding the
repayment plan itself (e.g., priority of certain creditors).
20
Courts use “cramdown,” “cram down” and “cram-down” interchangeably. See In re Shat, 424
B.R. 854, 858 n.7 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010). Although this section discusses the cramdown provision of
Chapter 11, the language of other cramdown provisions, such as the cramdown provision in Chapter 13
scenarios, are essentially the same. Some courts have held that the reasoning regarding the determination
of cramdown interest rates in one Chapter’s cramdown is applicable to other Chapters as well.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has been silent on this issue. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465
(2004).
21
See David G. Epstein, Don’t Go and Do Something Rash About Cram Down Interest Rates,
49 ALA. L. REV. 435, 438 (1998); Bruce A. Markell, Clueless on Classification: Toward Removing
Artificial Limits on Chapter 11 Claim Classification, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 2 (1995).
Note that certain provisions must be satisfied before a bankruptcy judge is allowed to apply a
cramdown.
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determinations.”22 However, to protect the interests of dissenting classes,
§ 1129(b) provides that the bankruptcy court must determine that the
repayment plan is “fair and equitable” and not unfairly discriminatory to
dissenting classes of creditors.23
To find a repayment plan fair and equitable, the bankruptcy court must
ensure that the repayment plan accommodates secured creditors in one of
three ways under § 1129(b)(2)(A).24 The first possibility is that the plan
proponent, usually the debtor-in-possession, may surrender the secured
property by selling the property free of the lien and transferring the
proceeds of the sale to the lien holder.25 Another way to satisfy the fair-andequitable requirement is by allowing the debtor-in-possession or plan
proponent to give the creditor an “indubitable equivalent” of its claim.26
Finally, under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), the plan proponent may seek to satisfy
the claim in full by issuing the secured creditor a new secured note payable
over a period of years, with interest, rather than a single payment on the
effective date of the plan.27 Unlike the other two options, this last option is
the only one that results in the creditor’s continued involvement with the
company throughout the reorganization plan. And it has been the subject of
much litigation and debate.
Under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), the plan proponent has the ability to
essentially write a new loan for its secured creditors. According to the
statute, the holder of a claim retains the lien on the property, but must
receive “deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of
such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the
value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.”28 In
other words, the bankruptcy plan must provide for the creditor to receive
interest, as well as cash equivalent to the value of the collateral securing the
creditor’s interest, as part of the future stream of payments. In 1988, the
Supreme Court noted in United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
22

In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010, 1020 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting In re 266
Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992)). Bankruptcy valuation disputes generally
occur over the valuation of debtor’s assets or the secured creditor’s collateral, which determines what
portion of a creditor’s claim will be secured rather than unsecured. See § 506 (discussing the role of
valuation in bankruptcy).
23
The primary focus under § 1129(b) is a repayment plan that embodies fairness and equity for
dissenting secured creditors. See § 1129(b)(1). The bankruptcy judge is given discretion in evaluating
the debtor’s proposed use of the property, offer of adequate protection of the creditors, proposed
borrowing, and any other business decisions under the business judgment rule. See § 363.
24
Any one of the three methods will satisfy the fair-and-equitable requirement for secured creditors.
See Arnold & Baker Farms v. United States (In re Arnold & Baker Farms), 85 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir.
1996); Wade v. Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1994).
25
See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.04[2][b], at 1129-125 to -127 (2012).
26
See id. ¶ 1129.04[2][c], at 1129-127 to -138.1.
27
See id. ¶ 1129.04[2], at 1129-120 (stating that the debtor “may satisfy the claim in full by giving
the creditor a note in the amount of the secured claim secured by the same collateral”).
28
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).

1933

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Associates, Ltd. that the “value, as of the effective date of the plan”
language in the cramdown provision requires a present value analysis.29
Under a present value analysis, the bankruptcy court must ensure that
the total stream of payments—or “deferred cash payments,” in the words of
the statute30—is set at a level sufficient to ensure the creditor receives the
present value of its secured claim, even though it will receive that value
over time. The deferred cash payments are discounted back to the present
value of the claim at confirmation to ensure that the creditor receives
disbursements of which the total present value equals or exceeds the
amount of the secured claim.31 To accomplish this, the deferred cash
payments must include an interest rate, or “discount rate,” which
appropriately compensates the secured creditor for the fact that the value of
its claim will be received over time rather than immediately.
For example, a creditor may have a claim of $50 secured by collateral
of equal value. Common sense dictates that $50 today is worth more than
$50 paid over a span of seven years; this is the reason why loans often
require interest payments in addition to payments of principal. In sum, the
$50 is reduced by inflation, risk, and the loss of opportunity to invest the
money elsewhere.32
To compensate the creditor for the time value of money that is lost by
the deferred repayment process, the bankruptcy courts apply an interest rate
to the debtor-in-possession’s deferred payments to creditors. However, the
proper way to determine an appropriate interest rate has been the subject of
much debate.
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged the need to apply an
interest rate to deferred payments to cramdown creditors,33 it has not yet
ruled on an appropriate method of determining an interest rate for Chapter
11 cramdown situations. The Bankruptcy Code is also silent on this issue.
As a result, courts have endorsed a variety of approaches to determining the
appropriate interest rate in Chapter 11 cramdowns.34 Courts have used many
different types of rates and methods to obtain rates, but there is not yet a
definitive answer. The next section discusses four different approaches that
have emerged over the years. These four approaches—each with its own
29

484 U.S. 365, 377 (1988). The present value analysis ensures that the creditor receives an amount
that equals or is greater than the present value of the collateral at the confirmation date.
30
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
31
Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 472 n.8 (1993).
32
See 2 GRANT GILMORE & DAVID GRAY CARLSON, GILMORE AND CARLSON ON SECURED
LENDING: CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY § 31.03 (2d ed. 2000).
33
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 469 (2004); Rake, 508 U.S. at 465–66.
34
See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Finding the Proper Chapter 11 Cramdown Rate of
Interest: Pick Your Experts Carefully, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec./Jan. 2000, at 20 (discussing various
methods used by the courts to establish an appropriate Chapter 11 cramdown interest rate or discount
rate); see also 2 GILMORE & CARLSON, supra note 32 (noting there are at least forty-eight different
approaches taken by courts).
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advantages and weaknesses—are: (1) the formula approach, (2) the coerced
loan approach, (3) the presumptive contract approach, and (4) the cost-offunds approach.35
A. Formula Approach
The formula approach requires a court to start with a base rate, such as
the national prime rate,36 and then to increase it to account for any
borrower-specific (or situation-specific) risk of nonpayment or default,
typically between 1% and 3%.37 For example, a court applying the formula
approach may accept a proposed cramdown interest rate of 8% if the plan
proponent can establish a national prime rate of 6.2% and a reasonable riskadjustment rate of 1.8%. Most courts peg the base rate to the national prime
rate of return.38
Although supporters of the formula approach emphasize its objectivity
and ease of use,39 many courts and commentators still question whether it
adequately compensates creditors. Given the recent economic downturn,
U.S. banks are tightening standards for lending.40 Borrowing has become
more costly for both consumers and companies that are hoping to make it
out of the recession.41 Under the formula approach, a debtor-in-possession
has the opportunity “to refinance at a rate generally unobtainable by any
like situated borrower.”42 Common borrowing practices dictate that a prime
or risk-free rate is typically given only to the best borrowers; it does not
35

See Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient, Inc.),
420 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 589–93 (7th Cir. 2002).
36
Till, 541 U.S. at 479 (“[T]he national prime rate . . . reflects the financial market’s estimate of the
amount a commercial bank should charge a creditworthy commercial borrower . . . .”). Other possible
base rates courts could choose—depending on the type of loan, its duration, and lender circumstances—
include LIBOR (London Interbank Offering Rate), Federal Home Loan Bank District Cost of Funds
Index (COFI), and U.S. Treasuries. “Financial markets generally consider these to be ‘risk-free’ or
nearly risk-free rates.” Ronald F. Greenspan & Cynthia Nelson, “UnTill” We Meet Again: Why the Till
Decision Might Not Be the Last Word on Cramdown Interest Rates, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec./Jan.
2005, at 48, 49.
37
Till, 541 U.S. at 480.
38
A prime rate of return is usually a reference to the interest rate used by banks. It is usually the rate
of interest at which banks lend to preferred customers, such as those with strong credit histories. See
Greenspan & Nelson, supra note 36, at 49 (defining the “national” prime rate, published by the Wall
Street Journal, “as the base rate on corporate loans posted by at least 75 percent of the nation’s 30
largest banks”).
39
Courts can readily and objectively ascertain the national prime rate. See Till, 541 U.S. at 479.
Beyond objectivity and simplicity, some supporters have argued that the formula approach instills
predictability because risk-free interest rates tend not to fluctuate drastically and thus allow creditors to
better establish contract rates and hedge any lending risks.
40
See Dan Wilchins & Emily Kaiser, U.S. Banks Tighten Lending Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/17/business/worldbusiness/17iht-lend.4.9295180.html.
41
See id.
42
Michael Elson, Note, Say “Ahhh!”: A New Approach for Determining the Cram Down Interest
Rate After Till v. SCS Credit, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1927 (2006).
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follow that a bankrupt debtor-in-possession would (or should) be given that
same rate. It is one thing for a bank that is in the business of lending to
determine the interest rate, but it is another for a court to unsystematically
establish one. Another concern that arises involves the determination of a
risk premium. The formula approach takes into account the risk specific to
each debtor-in-possession’s reorganization plan, but translating these risks
into nominal percentages is certainly more of a subjective challenge than an
objective one.
B. Coerced Loan Approach
Another approach endorsed by a number of courts is the coerced loan
approach.43 Under this approach, the court sets the cramdown interest rate at
the level the creditor would have obtained if it had “foreclosed [on the loan]
and reinvested the proceeds in loans of equivalent duration and risk.”44 The
bankruptcy court considers such factors as the payout period, the quality of
the security, and the risk of future default.45 In addition, the coerced loan
approach relies on evidence from actual credit markets. This approach
attempts to put the creditors in the place they would have been in had they
received the value of their claim and reloaned the funds in the open
market.46 It assumes that the best way to determine the appropriate stream
of future payments is by comparison to what the lender would charge in the
open market for a loan of similar duration and risk as to the “new” postcramdown loan.47
For example, assume that the debtor-in-possession borrows $1 million
to buy an office building, with the building itself as collateral. Under the
terms of the loan, the prepetition contract interest rate is 10%, whereas the
postpetition comparable market rate is 14%. Subsequently, the debtor-inpossession fails to make its loan payments and files for bankruptcy. Under a
coerced loan approach, the bankruptcy court will force the debtor-inpossession into a new loan of $1 million at a cramdown interest rate of
14%, which is the rate for a comparable loan in the market.
The coerced loan approach has several limited advantages. First, the
coerced loan prevents the debtor-in-possession from obtaining the windfall

43

See, e.g., GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 67 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d
925, 930 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1289 (8th Cir. 1986);
United States v. S. States Motor Inns, Inc. (In re S. States Motor Inns, Inc.), 709 F.2d 647, 653 (11th
Cir. 1983); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir. 1982).
44
Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-Am., ACA, 102 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 1996)
(discussing the coerced loan approach as one of multiple approaches to the cramdown subject).
45
See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re Bryson Props., XVIII), 961 F.2d 496, 500
n.4 (4th Cir. 1992).
46
See Thomas R. Fawkes & Steven M. Hartmann, Revisiting Till: Has a Consensus Emerged in
Chapter 11s?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jul./Aug. 2008, at 28, 28.
47
See id.

1936

106:1927 (2012)

Bankruptcy Cramdown

opportunities that the formula rate might give. The most obvious windfall is
allowing the debtor-in-possession potentially to refinance at a lower interest
rate than the current market or original contract rate, essentially rewarding
him for entering bankruptcy. Second, the coerced loan approach protects the
creditor’s expectations of lending in the open market.
Yet the coerced loan approach is open to the criticism that no actual
market exists for either the cramdown loan or a similar loan to a debtor-inpossession. Several other concerns are raised in the criticism of the coerced
loan approach.48 One is the lack of an equity cushion for the expected
depreciation of the collateral. Lenders, when lending to a borrower, almost
universally require some sort of equity cushion.49 However, in most
cramdown situations, there is no equity cushion because the bankruptcy
court forces the lender to make a new loan equal to the value of the
collateral plus interest.50 The lack of any equity cushion exposes the creditor
to an additional default risk.
Even though there are primary and secondary lending markets for debt
instruments created in Chapter 11 reorganizations that may yield reasonably
accurate interest rates,51 there is also concern about whether an actual
market can be replicated under the unique features of a Chapter 11
bankruptcy.52 Certain costs, such as monitoring costs, are not incorporated
into the actual markets the bankruptcy courts look to when determining an
appropriate cramdown interest rate under the coerced loan theory.53 If a
market does not exist for a particular loan, then “the policies behind
reorganization are significantly impacted.”54 Critics of the coerced loan
approach also argue that any market rate will include a lender’s profit
margin, which is not part of the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a
48

See John K. Pearson et al., Ending the Judicial Snipe Hunt: The Search for the Cramdown
Interest Rate, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 35, 44‒47 (1996); see also Fleet Fin., Inc. v. Ivey (In re
Ivey), 147 B.R. 109, 114‒16 (discussing the problems with the coerced loan approach).
49
The debtor’s “equity” in property securing a debt is the amount by which the market value of the
property exceeds the amount of the debt. An equity cushion exists when the debtor has sufficient equity
in the collateral to protect against its depreciation and the accrual of interest and charges. For example, a
debtor may place as collateral real property worth $55,000 for a $50,000 loan. However, secured claims
in bankruptcy proceedings are often valued at a similar or the same value as the collateral and therefore
lack an equity cushion. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006); GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 68 (3rd Cir. 1993).
50
See § 506(a). As under § 506(a), if a creditor’s claim is treated as a secured claim to the extent of
the value of the estate’s interest in the property, by definition there is no equity cushion because no
excess of the value of the property over the amount of the debt exists.
51
Cf. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 476 n.14 (2004) (noting that there are a number of
commercial lenders’ websites that offer to loan to companies in Chapter 11 proceedings).
52
For example, the loan may be too large and the market may have shrunk for loans of the type
proposed. See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][ii][B], at 1129-152.
53
Other expenses can include U.S. Trustee expenses and Creditor of Committee expenses. See, e.g.,
8 id. ¶ 1302.05, at 1302-29 (2010). Chapter 13 reorganizations do typically require a trustee that
monitors and controls the debtor’s assets. See id. ¶ 1302.03, at 1302-8 (2011).
54
7 id. ¶ 1129.05[2][c][ii][B], at 1129-152 (2009).
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creditor’s claim.55 This may overcompensate the lender at the expense of the
debtor-in-possession.56
C. Presumptive Contract Approach
Rather than looking at the market rate, the presumptive contract
approach requires a court to begin with the prepetition contract rate on the
presumption that the prebankruptcy interest rate on the loan is an accurate
reflection of the lending market.57 However, this presumption is rebuttable
by either the secured creditor or the debtor-in-possession—who is unlikely
to so rebut, given the likelihood that the cramdown is a product of the
proposed plan—with persuasive evidence that a lower cramdown interest
rate should apply based upon current market conditions or changes in the
debtor-in-possession’s risk profile.58 However, the right to rebut the
presumptive contract may be costly. “The debtor must obtain information
about the creditor’s costs of overhead, financial circumstances, and lending
practices to rebut the presumptive contract rate.”59
For example, similar to the hypothetical in the coerced-loan-approach
scenario, assume that the debtor-in-possession borrows $1 million to buy an
office building, which will serve as collateral. Prebankruptcy, the parties
agree to a long-term loan with a contract interest rate of 10%. Subsequently,
the debtor-in-possession fails to make its loan payments and files for
bankruptcy. Under the presumptive contract approach, the bankruptcy court
will force the creditor into a new loan with a cramdown interest rate of
10%, which is the original negotiated contract rate.
The presumptive contract approach possesses certain advantages. The
most obvious benefit is that the cramdown interest rate is predetermined by
the contract creating the original loan. Courts find this cost-effective
method for determining the cramdown interest rate particularly attractive in
55

See Elson, supra note 42, at 1930. However, presumably, the original contract rate between the
parties included a lender’s profit margin. Thus, one can argue that a creditor is not paid in full under a
bankruptcy proceeding unless a lender’s profit margin is included.
56
Reorganization plans are approved by the bankruptcy judge, who must consider the feasibility of
the plan.
57
See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.),
456 F.3d 668, 679 (6th Cir. 2006) (“When a debtor is solvent, . . . the presumption is that a bankruptcy
court’s role is merely to enforce the contractual rights of the parties, and the role that equitable
principles play in the allocation of competing interest is significantly reduced.”).
58
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 473 (2004) (“[T]he court remanded the case to the
Bankruptcy Court to afford petitioners and respondent an opportunity to rebut the presumptive 21%
rate.”); GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 71 (3rd Cir. 1993) (“[I]f a debtor proposes a plan with a rate less
than the contract rate, it would be appropriate, in the absence of a stipulation, for a bankruptcy court to
require the debtor to come forward with some evidence that the creditor’s current rate is less than the
contract rate.”).
59
Till, 541 U.S. at 478. A debtor seeking to rebut the presumptive contract rate may need to
introduce expert testimony about the creditor’s financial condition, increasing the evidentiary burden on
the debtor.
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bankruptcy proceedings, where the debtor-in-possession has limited
resources.60 Assuming there is no attempt to rebut the prepetition rate, the
debtor-in-possession is able to save resources by avoiding the expense of
discovery and evidentiary hearings.61 Second, the presumptive contract
approach protects the justified expectations of both the creditor and the
debtor-in-possession. By entering into the initial creditor–debtor
relationship, both parties are given proper notice of their duties and
obligations. It eliminates the subjective dimensions found in other
approaches.
However, like the other approaches, the presumptive contract approach
has its deficiencies. For example, many courts face the question of whether
they should cram down contractual subprime mortgage rates that are
characterized as being higher than standard market interest rates.62 The
interest rates charged on these subprime mortgages are so outrageously high
that more often than not the debtor-in-possession is unable to satisfy its
obligations.63 Critics also stress that the approach does not adequately take
into consideration important differences between the actual lending market
and the cramdown situation.64
D. Cost-of-Funds Approach
The cost-of-funds approach requires the court to set the cramdown
interest rate at the rate another lender would charge the debtor to borrow an
amount equal to the value of the secured claim.65 It is based on the
60

See In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The continuation of the old contract rate to the
bankrupt debtor under the supervision of the bankruptcy court will . . . also result in some economies.”);
Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211, 214‒15 (5th Cir. 1997)
(“Chapter 13 cases, because of the greater need to reduce litigation expenses associated with an
individualized discount rate determination, call for particular guidance in the selection of the appropriate
post-confirmation interest rate.”).
61
See Smithwick, 121 F.3d at 214‒15 (noting that in Chapter 11 proceedings the interest rate
determination requires expert testimony on valuation).
62
See Household Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Burden (In re Kidd), 315 F.3d 671, 673–74 (6th Cir. 2003).
63
See Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair Housing Act and
Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 166
(2009) (“[M]any subprime borrowers fall into delinquency and foreclosure, [and] since a
disproportionate share of such loans were made in communities of color, a disproportionate share of the
foreclosures will also fall on such communities.”). Subprime interest rates can be as high as 20.95%. See
Kidd, 315 F.3d at 673 (“[S]ub-prime lenders generally charged higher rates of interest on their loans,
ranging from 20.95% to 24.95% for automobile loans.”). Payday loans provide another example of high
contractual interest rates. Payday loans are short-term cash advances secured by future paychecks.
Typical rates for these loans range from 200% to 300%. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic,
Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 518, 581 n.300 (2004).
64
See Hartman, supra note 6, at 536–38.
65
8 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1325.06[4]; Michael G. Williamson, Determining Cram Down
Interest Rates Post-Till (Am. Bankr. Inst. 10th Annual Se. Bankr. Workshop, Kiawah Island Resort,
S.C.), July 27–30, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/financebank/
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assumption that the secured creditor will borrow new funds to replace the
money tied up in the bankruptcy and that secured creditors have access to
additional funding.66 A number of bankruptcy courts have adopted the cost–
of-funds approach,67 but no circuit court has yet implemented it.68
The major difficulty associated with the cost-of-funds approach is its
underlying assumption that the secured creditor has access to an unlimited
supply of credit.69 With a limited amount of credit to draw on, “utilizing
[the secured creditor’s] borrowing capacity without providing . . . the usual
return on its capital produces a loss for the secured creditor.”70 The
approach does not consider the administrative costs and normal profits from
lending.71
Another difficulty associated with the cost-of-funds approach is its
failure to account for the risk of default.72 “[T]he focus is on the
creditworthiness of the creditor, not the creditworthiness of the debtor.”73 In
determining the proper cost-of-funds interest rate, the court will assess the
creditor’s business structure, capital, operational efficiency, and credit
history.74 An inefficient or poorly capitalized lender will generate a different
cost-of-funds interest rate than a more efficient and better capitalized
lender.75 This approach fails to reflect the debtor-in-possession’s status as a
borrower; it further fails to consider the likelihood of a Chapter 11 debtorin-possession being more creditworthy—and therefore able to access
money more cheaply—than the creditor is. For example, a lender with
operational inefficiencies may charge higher interest to cover its losses.
III. TILL AND THE CRAMDOWN CONTROVERSY
Prior to 2004, courts applied a variety of methods in establishing the
proper cramdown interest rate, including the four methods discussed

vol2num1/cramdown.pdf; see GMAC v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he
‘cost of funds’ approach[] bases the market rate on the rate that the creditor itself pays when it borrows
funds.”).
66
See United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir. 1993). The formula approved in
these cases can better be described as approximating the debtor’s cost of funds than as the secured
creditor’s cost of funds. See GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 69 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993).
67
See In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 190 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991); Elson, supra note 42, at 1933.
68
Elson, supra note 42, at 1933; Williamson, supra note 65, at 2.
69
See Epstein, supra note 21, at 450.
70
United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1130; see Epstein, supra note 21, at 450.
71
See Elson, supra note 42, at 1934.
72
Epstein, supra note 21, at 450–51; see United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1130.
73
Epstein, supra note 21, at 451.
74
Id.
75
Id. (“[A] cram down interest rate based on the cost of funds approach in essence rewards a lender
for being inefficient or poorly capitalized. More efficient and better capitalized lenders will have lower
costs of funds.”).
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above.76 Consensus on which of these approaches should apply in a Chapter
11 proceeding was a “distant reality.”77 However, in 2004, the Supreme
Court addressed the important question of how to select an appropriate
interest rate for cramdown situations in Till v. SCS Credit Corp.78
In the case, Lee and Amy Till owned and operated a used pickup truck
worth $4000 that was subject to a debt to SCS Credit Corporation (SCS).79
The Tills had bought the truck just one year earlier, financing the purchase
with a loan that had a “subprime” interest rate of 21% for 136 weeks. Under
the contract, the Tills agreed to make 68 biweekly payments to cover the
debt; if the Tills defaulted, SCS retained the right to repossess the truck.80
Subsequently, the Tills filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and elected to
pursue a “cramdown option.” Under the proposed Chapter 13 plan, the Tills
would pay 9.5% interest on the secured portion of SCS’s claim,
representing a 1.5% “risk adjustment” to the 8% national prime rate at the
time.81 The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan’s 9.5% cramdown interest
rate. On appeal, the district court reversed and held that the 21%
“subprime” interest rate per the original contract was the proper rate. On a
subsequent appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district
court’s judgment and remanded, expressing the view that the contract’s
21% interest ought to serve as the “presumptive” cramdown rate.82 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded the case back to
the bankruptcy court.83
A. The Value of Till
In Till, the issue was how to establish a proper cramdown rate on a
used truck in a Chapter 13 case.84 The decision in Till consisted of a fourJustice plurality opinion,85 a concurring opinion,86 and a four-Justice
dissenting opinion. Although there was no approach endorsed by a clear

76

See Fawkes & Hartmann, supra note 46, at 28.
Id.
78
541 U.S. 465 (2004).
79
Id. at 470. The Tills’ outstanding claim at the time of filing was $4894.89, but as agreed by the
parties, the value of the truck securing the claim was only $4000. Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 471.
82
Id. at 472‒73.
83
Id. at 473, 485.
84
Id. at 474‒75.
85
Id. at 468. A plurality opinion is the controlling opinion when no majority opinion exists. It is
written when a majority of judges agree on the outcome, but not on the reasoning behind that outcome.
For example, in a twelve-member court, seven judges believe that the plaintiff should win a given case,
but only four of them agree on the reasoning behind that decision. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188 (1977) (explaining how the holding of a case should be interpreted when there is only a plurality).
86
Justice Thomas authored the lone concurrence. Till, 541 U.S. at 485 (Thomas, J., concurring).
77

1941

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

majority of the Justices, five Justices rejected the presumptive contract
approach for the Chapter 13 case.87
In Till, Justice Stevens, announcing the judgment of the Court and the
plurality opinion, accepted the formula approach as the ideal method of
calculating an appropriate interest rate in Chapter 13 contexts.88 The
plurality found the formula approach—in comparison to the other
approaches—a “straightforward, familiar, and objective inquiry, [which]
minimizes the need for potentially costly additional evidentiary
proceedings.”89 Justice Thomas, concurring, agreed with the plurality that
the use of the presumptive contract rate was inappropriate,90 but opted for a
“risk-free” rate that did not include the risk-factor adjustment found in the
plurality’s formula approach.91 He reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code only
required a valuation of the property to be distributed under the plan, not the
promise to pay pursuant to the plan.92 Thus, because the risk of default was
not relevant in valuing the underlying property, the risk-free rate itself was
enough to satisfy the Bankruptcy Code.
The dissent, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, endorsed using the
contract rate of the original agreement as a rebuttable presumption of (and
proxy for) the market rate when determining the appropriate interest rate in
cramdown situations in the absence of other evidence.93 The dissent favored
using a contract rate based on the view that “lending markets are
competitive”94 and that the contract rate yields the most accurate estimate of
a market interest rate.95 In addition, the dissent agreed with the plurality on
the need to compensate creditors for the increased risk of nonpayment and
default once the debtor has entered bankruptcy. According to the dissent,
relevant factors in determining the risk premium include: “(1) the
87

Four Justices joined the plurality reasoning (formula approach), see id. at 468 (plurality opinion),
and Justice Thomas endorsed a variant of the formula approach, id. at 491 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting that the risk-free rate alone satisfies the statute’s textual requirement that the creditor receive the
value of its claim, and that therefore the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed).
88
Id. at 468, 479‒80 (plurality opinion). The plurality also found that debtors and creditors should
be allowed to present evidence about the appropriate risk adjustments, with the evidentiary burden on
the creditors (as information will be far more accessible to creditors than to individual debtors). Id. at
484‒85.
89
Id. at 479.
90
Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).
91
See id. at 486–91.
92
Id. at 486.
93
Id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, a presumptive contract rate can be rebutted by
evidence from the debtor showing the creditor’s rate on current lending is less than the contract rate.
GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 70‒71 (3d Cir. 1993).
As discussed above, rebutting a presumptive contract rate may be costly. The debtor must obtain
evidence that includes, but may not be limited to, the creditor’s overhead costs, financial circumstances,
and lending practices. See discussion supra Part II.C.
94
Till, 541 U.S. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95
See id. at 492–99.
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probability of plan failure; (2) the rate of collateral depreciation; (3) the
liquidity of the collateral market; and (4) the administrative expenses of
enforcement.”96
Although the case revolved around a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, much
debate arose with respect to the application of Till outside of the Chapter 13
context.97 Justice Stevens, speaking for the Till plurality, wrote, “We think it
likely that Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow
essentially the same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate
under any of these provisions.”98 A plain interpretation of the statement
would suggest that the formula approach should be used in Chapter 11
scenarios too. However, in a later footnote, the Court appears to suggest
that an “efficient market” approach would be preferred.99 The Court noted:
Because every cramdown loan is imposed by a court over the objection of the
secured creditor, there is no free market of willing cramdown lenders.
Interestingly, the same is not true in the Chapter 11 context, as numerous
lenders advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors in possession. . . . Thus,
when picking a cramdown rate in a Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to
ask what rate an efficient market would produce.100

The argument against according precedential effect to Till’s plurality
opinion outside the Chapter 13 context is in its “substantial
inconsistency”;101 as shown above, the plurality itself seems internally
conflicted over the preferred approach in Chapter 11 conditions.102
Another possible reason why Till is not binding on non-Chapter 13
situations is that there are inherent differences between Chapter 11 and
Chapter 13 bankruptcies. Failing businesses are hardly the same as private
individuals failing with their personal financial affairs. Just to survive,
private individuals may need to incur daily expenses on food, housing,
health care, and many other personal care products.103 One might also worry
over whether the individual is a sophisticated party who has the necessary
resources to protect his or her bankruptcy rights.104 Chapter 13 is meant to
96

Id. at 499.
See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient,
Inc.), 420 F.3d 559, 566‒67 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[E]ven though the [Till] plurality is clear that the formula
approach is the preferable method for Chapter 13 cases, the opinion is less clear about cases in the
Chapter 11 context.”); In re Prussia Assocs., 322 B.R. 572, 585 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (opining that
whether Till applies to Chapter 11 cases is “an undecided question”); see also Fawkes & Hartmann,
supra note 46, at 28–29, 66 (discussing the effects of Till on subsequent Chapter 11 cases).
98
Till, 541 U.S. at 474.
99
Id. at 476 n.14.
100
Id.
101
Fawkes & Hartmann, supra note 46, at 28.
102
See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
103
Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2006) (summarizing the potential monthly expenses of a debtor).
104
See Donald R. Lassman, Individual Chapter 11s Really Do Work: Practical Considerations for
Small-Business Debtors, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2008, at 18, 18 (“Because chapter 11 can be much
97
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only protect insolvent individuals, whereas Chapter 11 filers are generally
businesses.105 Both Chapter 13 and Chapter 11, like the Bankruptcy Code as
a whole, advance the dual goals of providing debtor relief and satisfying
creditors’ claims.106 The legislative history of Chapter 11 reveals no
preference between the dual goals. However, the legislative history of
Chapter 13 reveals “Congress’s goal of increasing the efficacy of the fresh
start that bankruptcy provides individuals,” which suggests, in the context
of Chapter 13 bankruptcies, that a debtor-in-possession’s fresh start might
be more important than the rights of creditors.107
It may also help to focus on the differences between individuals and
businesses. Each are distinct legal entities and the Code itself acknowledges
this through the creation of different bankruptcy provisions for each.108 The
distinction between individuals and businesses is important because the
impact of bankruptcy on a corporation is bound to differ in many respects
from its impact on individuals.109 An approach that works for Chapter 13
bankruptcies, such as the formula approach, might not necessarily work for
Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Thus, courts are left with an opportunity to
consider new approaches in regards to Chapter 11 bankruptcies.
B. Plurality Opinion
It is also important that Till’s ruling was based on a plurality opinion.110
The force of a plurality decision generally depends on the level of
agreement or disagreement exhibited by the various opinions issued.111 In
more complex than chapter 13, assembling a team of professionals, particularly accounting professionals
with chapter 11 experience, can be essential to success.”).
105
Individuals who engage in business may also file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. See
2 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 109.05[1], at 109-35 (2010). However, as noted above, the focus of this
Comment is primarily on corporations and other business entities filing Chapter 11 bankruptcies.
106
7 id. ¶ 1100.01; see also Carpenter v. Fanaras (In re Fanaras), 263 B.R. 655, 671 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2001) (“The twin goals of bankruptcy law [are] debtor relief and equitable distribution . . . .”); C.
Scott Pryor, Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 9: Impact in Bankruptcy, 7 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 465, 514 (1999) (stating that the two co-equal goals of bankruptcy “are the collective
enforcement of claims recognized by state law and the rehabilitation of the debtor”).
107
Elson, supra note 42, at 1942. In the context of Chapter 13, there is legislative history to suggest
a debtor-in-possession’s fresh start is more important than the rights of creditors. See 8 COLLIER, supra
note 16, ¶ 1300.02 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 117 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6077–78).
108
See Richard H.W. Maloy, Comparative Bankruptcy, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 10
(2000) (“Although Chapter 11 is not restricted to business-debtors, business entities file under
Chapter 11 far more frequently than individual debtors do. Adjustment of debts under Chapter 13 is
limited to individuals.”); Mark A. Davis, Comment, Toibb v. Radloff: Chapter 11 Relief Now Available
to Individual Debtors, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 693, 710 (1993) (“Given the complexities associated with a
Chapter 11 petition, most individual debtors will seek relief under Chapter 7 or 13.”).
109
See, e.g., discussion infra Part V.B.
110
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 468 (2004).
111
A plurality opinion is the opinion that received more support than any other in a situation in
which no opinion commanded a majority. Plurality opinions present a precedential quagmire for lower
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Marks v. United States, the Supreme Court explained how the holding of a
case should be viewed where there is no majority supporting the rationale
of any opinion.112 “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [the majority], ‘the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds . . . .’”113
The lack of a majority rationale weakens the precedential effect of Till
in non-Chapter 13 situations, especially because each opinion endorses a
different method for determining interest rates. The narrowest interpretation
is that the Supreme Court did not endorse the coerced loan approach for
Chapter 13 debtors.114 There is, however, no indication that a majority of the
Justices would agree on the cramdown interest rate approach in nonChapter 13 situations, such as a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Only the plurality opinion explicitly discusses the applicability of Till
to other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.115 Justice Thomas’s
concurrence and the dissent in Till are silent on the issue.116 Furthermore,
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion only focuses on what is necessary in a
plan to satisfy § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii); there is no mention of § 1129(b)(2) or
Chapter 11 plans at all.117
As such, Till leaves lower courts without any clear guidance as to
which rule to apply in Chapter 11 cramdown cases.118 As there is no
uniform holding with regard to Till’s applicability to non-Chapter 13
provisions, Till, at most, is instructive. Lower courts are left free to reach
their own conclusion as to the appropriate cramdown interest rate for
Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Therefore, Till does not prevent courts from
adopting the contract rate approach set forth in this Comment.
federal courts. See generally Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare
Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (1956) (analyzing the precedential problems posed by plurality opinions
and classifying them based on their usefulness).
112
430 U.S. 188, 193–94 (1977).
113
Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell
& Stevens, JJ.)).
114
Till, 541 U.S. at 477. While no opinion commanded a majority of the Justices, neither the
plurality nor the concurrence endorsed the coerced loan approach. See also Elson, supra note 42, at
1934–39 (discussing the precedential value of the court’s holding in Till, and noting that “[t]he
narrowest interpretation is that the Supreme Court did not endorse the Seventh Circuit’s ruling [favoring
the coerced loan approach]”).
115
See Till, 541 U.S. at 474–75.
116
See id. at 485–508 (Thomas, J., concurring & Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, in arguing for
the coerced loan approach, noted that the Court has assumed market competitiveness in the Chapter 11
context. Id. at 492, 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the dissent makes no further mention of nonChapter 13 bankruptcies.
117
Id. at 485–91 (Thomas, J., concurring). Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) is the Chapter 13 equivalent to
Chapter 11’s § 1129. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006), with id. § 1129.
118
See Elson, supra note 42, at 1936–39.
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C. Current Interpretation of Till
Even with the evidentiary suggestion in Till’s footnote fourteen, courts
continue to struggle with determining Chapter 11 cramdown interest rates
and defining what constitutes an “efficient market.”119 Some courts purport
to utilize an efficient market approach, while others continue to rely on
Till’s formula approach.120
Although courts have yet to reach a Chapter 11 cramdown
consensus,121 several cases show that there is a growing trend toward the
efficient market approach.122 In Bank of Montreal v. Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors (In re American Homepatient, Inc.), the Sixth Circuit
squarely addressed the issue of applying Till in the Chapter 11 context.123
Recognizing what Till’s footnote suggested, the Sixth Circuit articulated an
efficient market approach124 and held that “the market rate should be applied
in Chapter 11 cases where there exists an efficient market.”125 When no
efficient market exists for a loan to a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, “the
bankruptcy court should employ the formula approach endorsed by the Till
plurality.”126
In Mercury Capital Corp. v. Milford Connecticut Associates, L.P., the
district court held that “the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt did not necessarily err as a
matter of law” in applying the Till plurality’s formula rate approach to a
119

See Fawkes & Hartmann, supra note 46, at 28–29, 66. At least one court that has examined
cramdown interest rates post-Till has concluded Till does not apply in a Chapter 11 context. See In re
Prussia Assocs., 322 B.R. 572, 585 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Till is instructive, but it is not controlling,
insofar as mandating the use of the ‘formula’ approach described in Till in every Chapter 11 case.”).
However, several commentators have argued that Chapter 11 cases are not quite as dissimilar to Chapter
13 cases as the Till Court assumed, in which case the Till formula approach could also apply to Chapter
11 cases. See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c], at 1129-148 to -149.
120
A number of post-Till Chapter 11 cases have relied on the formula approach to determine an
appropriate cramdown. See In re Mendoza, No. 09-11678, 2010 WL 1610120, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
Apr. 20, 2010); In re Field, No. 04-00028-TLM, 2005 WL 3148287, at *4‒6 (Bankr. D. Idaho Oct. 17,
2005); In re Deep River Warehouse, Inc., No. 04-52749, 2005 WL 2319201, at *9‒11 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
Sept. 22, 2005). Other courts have simply assumed that the prepetition contract rate is also the efficient
market rate, without evidence to support a conclusion that such an equation is fair and reasonable under
the circumstances. See Interim Capital, LLC v. Hank’s Dock, Inc. (In re Seaspan Dev. Corp.), Nos. 0421339, 04-21340, 2:05-CV-315, 2006 WL 2672298, at *1‒4 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 18, 2006); In re Sylvan I30 Enters., No. 05–86708–HDH–11, 2006 WL 2539718, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2006).
121
See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c], at 1129-149 to -151.
122
See id. at 1129-150 to -151. The efficient market approach is also known as the hybrid formula
approach and the two terms can be used interchangeably.
123
420 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2005).
124
See id. at 567–68; see also infra Part IV.
125
Am. Homepatient, 420 F.3d at 568. In an analysis of the American Homepatient decision,
commentators have argued that the Sixth Circuit essentially relied on a coerced loan approach in setting
the interest rate on a partially secured cramdown loan based on the type of loan at issue. See Robert
Goodrich & Madison Martin, Emptying the “Till”: The Sixth Circuit Sequel, NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISER, June 2006, available at 2006 No. 06 Norton Bankr. L. Adviser 1.
126
Am. Homepatient, 420 F.3d at 568.
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Chapter 11 context.127 However, the district court vacated the decision and
remanded the case due to insufficient evidence in the record to determine if
an efficient market rate existed for the type of loan contemplated by the
plan.128 Additionally, the court noted that the debtor’s plan did not apply the
Till formula correctly because the record lacked any evidence as to the
national prime rate, which is the baseline rate of Till’s formula approach.129
In another case concerning the proper Chapter 11 cramdown interest
rate, the court in In re Northwest Timberline Enterprises, Inc.130 adopted the
Till formula approach after it found that there was no “efficient market” for
loans identical to what was being offered by the secured creditor. The court
approved a 13.75% discount rate, adding a 5.75% risk adjustment to the 8%
prime rate.131
These decisions demonstrate that courts will focus on whether an
efficient lending market exists before applying a formula rate to determine
the proper Chapter 11 cramdown interest rate. Yet whether this is the most
rational approach to the problem is debatable. The next Part will further
explore the efficient market approach and methods of defining an “efficient
market.”
IV. THE EFFICIENT MARKET APPROACH
Under the efficient market approach as applied by In re American
Homepatient, the courts will first conduct an “efficient market” analysis and
determine whether there is an applicable market rate that can fairly
compensate a creditor for its exposure.132 An obvious possible advantage is
that an efficient market rate of interest may accurately capture the present
value of the secured claim, thus fulfilling the fair-and-equitable requirement
of the cramdown provisions.133 More importantly, the efficient market
approach
can
adequately
protect
the
lender
from
being
undercompensated.134 In the current economic downturn, it can be argued
that greater emphasis should be placed on preserving the rights of creditors
and ensuring their proper compensation. To provide adequate relief and
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354 B.R. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 2006).
Id. at 12‒13.
129
Id. at 13.
130
348 B.R. 412, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
131
Id.
132
See 420 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2005).
133
See GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). The efficient market rate of interest will
also reduce concerns that the creditor is undercompensated during the bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
134
See In re Smith, 178 B.R. 946, 955–56 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995) (“In a perfect bankruptcy world, a
debtor-in-possession and a creditor would come to agreement on the perfect discount rate for every
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy. That is, they would arrive at a claim position that allows a debtor to
survive and a creditor to earn an appropriate return on the claim in any future interest rate
environment.” (emphasis added)).
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prevent further impairment of lenders and the vulnerable lending market,
courts, when possible, should apply a market rate approach for Chapter 11
cramdown situations.135 However, what is an “efficient market” and when
does one exist?
The remainder of this Part will explore the meaning of an efficient
market. First, it will provide an overview of what constitutes an efficient
market and its connection with debtor-in-possession financing. Then, it will
provide a quick summary of debtor-in-possession financing before
continuing with a discussion of why the availability of debtor-in-possession
financing should not equate to the existence of an “efficient market.”
A. Defining an Efficient Market
An efficient market should reveal what a debtor and a creditor, both
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts, are willing to agree upon.
Although Till did not define the term “efficient market,” the term has
appeared quite frequently in other areas of law, especially securities
litigation. In the context of securities fraud, “an efficient market is one in
which market price fully reflects all publicly available information.”136 The
efficient market is based on the assumptions that: “(1) all investors have
costless access to currently available information about the future; (2) all
investors are good analysts; and (3) all investors pay close attention to
market prices and adjust their holdings appropriately.”137 One can infer that
availability of material information is the key ingredient for defining an
efficient market in securities litigation. However, whether bankruptcy
courts will adopt this definition is yet to be determined.
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See Lehman Brothers, Sharper Image, Bennigan’s and Beyond: Is Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Working?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong 10–17 (2008) (statement of Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Benno C. Schmidt Chair of
Business Law, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law) (discussing recent bankruptcies and the lending market’s
exposure).
136
Bowe v. PolyMedica Corp. (In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2005)
(citing Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance,
28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 (2003) (“[T]he common definition of market efficiency . . . is really a shorthand
for the empirical claim that ‘available information’ does not support profitable trading strategies or
arbitrage opportunities.”)); see also Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 661 n.6 (5th Cir.
2004) (“[W]here securities are traded in an efficient market, it is assumed that all public information
concerning a company is known to the market and reflected in the market price of the company’s
stock.”); GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 208 (3d. Cir. 2001) (defining “efficient
marketplace” as one “in which stock prices reflect all available relevant information about the stock’s
economic value”); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1163 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that in an efficient
market, “the investor must rely on the market to perform a valuation process which incorporates all
publicly available information, including misinformation”).
137
Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and
Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1991) (quoting G. ALEXANDER
& W. SHARPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTMENTS 67 (1989)).
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Rather, we can look back at Till for some guidance on defining market
efficiency in the bankruptcy context. In Till, the Court acknowledged that
“there is no readily apparent Chapter 13 cramdown market rate of interest:
Because every cramdown loan is imposed by a court over the objection of
the secured creditor, there is no free market of willing cramdown
lenders.”138 The Court then noted that this is not necessarily true for Chapter
11 debtors-in-possession seeking financing. As the plurality in Till
recognized, “[N]umerous lenders advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors
in possession.”139 This suggests that the wide availability of debtor-inpossession financing may be sufficient to establish an efficient market for
Chapter 11 situations. However, many believe “the Till plurality’s footnote
discussion of Chapter 11 [represents] a misunderstanding of the nature of
[debtor-in-possession] financing.”140 To consider this contention, we must
further explore the concept of debtor-in-possession financing.
B. Debtor-in-Possession Financing
Debtor-in-possession financing is typically “a relatively short-term,
restrictive loan that contains more stringent covenants and features higher
interest rates and fees.”141 More often than not, it is the existing lender that
provides some of the loan or the entire loan to the debtor-in-possession.142
This form of financing can be highly profitable for lenders such as financial
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Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 476 n.14 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
140
The Great Debates Resolved: The Till Rate of Interest Is Applicable in Chapter 11 Cases (Am.
Bankr. Inst. 30th Annual Midwestern Bankr. Inst.), 2010, at 252, available at http://www.abiworld.org/
committees/newsletters/busreorg/vol9num10/till.pdf; see 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][i],
at 1129-148 to -149.
141
George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 50 (2004); see also id.
at 50‒56 (discussing the nature of, and common covenants that are associated with, debtor-in-possession
(DIP) financing loans). Debtor-in-possession financing is generally used to fund operating activities
during Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Lenders generally require “the debtor [to] use the proceeds specifically
as working capital, for general corporate purposes, allowed operating expenses, or a specific real estate
development or acquisition.” Id. at 51‒52 (footnotes omitted). Additionally, most debtor-in-possession
financing loans are typically in the form of a revolving credit agreement utilizing inventory or accounts
receivable as the primary collateral. Id. at 51. A revolving credit agreement is generally a type of loan in
which the bank promises to lend the borrower up to a specific maximum amount during a specified time
period. See Glossary of Economic Terms, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., http://www.frbsf.org/tools/
glossary/index.html (search “open-end credit”) (last visited June 17, 2012).
142
U.S. statistics suggest that the existing lender provides some or all of the debtor-in-possession
loan in 58% of Chapter 11 cases. Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and
Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 265 (2003). Additionally, DIP
financing tends to increase a firm’s chances of emerging successfully from Chapter 11 bankruptcy based
on a sample taken from all Chapter 11 cases filed. Id. at 273; see also Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R.
Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 524 (2009) (finding
that 50% of firms in a sample of firms in Chapter 11 bankruptcy obtained DIP financing and that 54% of
those obtained financing from a preexisting creditor).
139

1949

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

institutions, hedge funds, and private equity firms.143 Generally, the rates of
interest and loan fees charged on debtor-in-possession financing are higher
than traditional loans, presumably to offset the risk of lending to an
insolvent company that may not emerge from bankruptcy.144
One important feature of debtor-in-possession financing is that the loan
is almost always secured. Most of the time, it is secured by all of the
corporation’s assets.145 Accordingly, it follows that a judge can look to the
interest rate of the debtor-in-possession financing loan to determine the
cramdown of the creditor’s collateral.
In regard to lending practices for debtor-in-possession financing, it is
clear that lenders are willing to lend to bankrupt corporations under Chapter
11.146 In 2008, debtor-in-possession financing was at a five-year record
high, totaling approximately $18.1 billion.147 This marked a 33% increase
from 2007, and the market is expected to continue to grow.148 Moreover, a
number of papers have acknowledged the ubiquity of debtor-in-possession
financing during the 1990s.149
C. Concerns Regarding the Efficient Market Approach and Debtor-inPossession Financing
Although it appears that there is indeed a readily available debtor-inpossession financing market, there are several reasons why it should not be
used to determine a proper efficient market cramdown rate.
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Mark Schrager, Financing the Insolvent Company—An Overview 14–16 (Aug. 2006), available
at http://www.dwpv.com/images/Financing_the_Insolvent_Company_-_An_Overview.pdf.
144
Id. The higher rates of interest and loan fees reflect a risk premium due to the nature of the
debtor-in-possession. Id. at 14.
145
See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 142, at 522‒24 (finding that 92% of DIP loans are secured
by all of the debtor corporation’s assets).
146
See David W. Marston, DIP Financing Issues and Alternatives, GIBBONS (Apr. 7, 2009),
http://www.gibbonslaw.com/news_publications/articles.php?action=display_publication&publication_id
=2734 (“We never lost one penny in Chapter 11 financings in all of those years.” (quoting Sterling
Chairman Louis Cappelli)); see also Michelle J. White, Economics of Corporate and Personal
Bankruptcy Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 4–9 (2d ed. 2008).
The efficient market approach is not likely to be applicable for Chapter 13 individual debtors.
Presumably, individuals have significantly less nonexempt assets available as collateral to securitize
new loans. This ultimately reduces the attractiveness of lending to individuals. While individuals can file
bankruptcy under Chapter 11, that is beyond the scope of this paper. In this Comment, I primarily focus
on corporations filing under Chapter 11.
147
See Stephen A. Donato & Thomas L. Kennedy, Trends in DIP Financing: Not as Bad as It
Seems?, J CORP. RENEWAL, Sept./Oct. 2009, at 4, 5, available at http://www.turnaround.org/
Publications/Articles.aspx?objectId=11602 (“DIP loans traditionally were viewed as safe and profitable
for lenders and were almost taken for granted by many potential debtors.”).
148
Id.
149
See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 142, at 515 (surveying research).
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The first reason is associated with the idea that a relevant efficient
market for Chapter 11 loans “may be just as illusory as in chapter 13.”150
This argument takes aim at what it suggests is an “inapt and unstated
inference the Court makes with respect to the similarity between the interest
rates applicable to [debtor-in-possession] financing and the interest rates
applicable to loans imposed upon dissenting creditors at cramdown.”151
Debtor-in-possession financing generally occurs at the beginning of a
bankruptcy case, whereas the determination of a Chapter 11 cramdown rate
under § 1129(b)(2) occurs at confirmation.152 Therefore, given the
differences in timing, there are generally more risks associated with the
lending when a debtor-in-possession seeks financing than when a debtor-inpossession seeks a cramdown confirmation.153 An appropriate Chapter 11
cramdown rate should be less than the rate offered to a debtor-in-possession
seeking financing.
The second reason is the fear that bankruptcy lenders may charge
excessive rates in an efficient market. Bankruptcy lenders, such as debtorin-possession financing lenders, can take advantage of the debtor-inpossession’s need for interim financing, thus forcing the debtor-inpossession to “obtain credit in order to save [itself] from liquidation and
often ha[s] little negotiating leverage.”154 One commentator has stated that
while debtor-in-possession financing loans “may in fact be very low risk
credits, . . . they are [in reality] priced as very high risk credits.”155 The
argument is that debtor-in-possession financing markets present excessive
rates, are unlike normal credit markets, and do not reflect an efficient
market.156
Under these circumstances, it does not make sense for a court to look
toward debtor-in-possession financing to establish an efficient market.
“Equating the availability of [debtor-in-possession] financing with the
existence of an ‘efficient market’ for secured exit financing seems quite a
stretch. The ‘market’ for [debtor-in-possession] loans is not like regular
credit markets and not like the markets for exit financing.”157
150

7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][i], at 1129-148.
Id.
152
See id.
153
Id. at 1129-148 to -149 (“Thus, instead of the interim and inherently more uncertain risk present
in debtor in possession financing, the court at confirmation is presented with a less risky, more stable
and restructured debtor; the fact that the debtor is more stable is bound up in the court’s necessary
feasibility determination under section 1129(a)(11).”).
154
Adam Strochak, A Cram Session on Cramdown Interest Rates, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (June 22,
2011), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/chapter-11-plans/a-cram-session-on-cramdowninterest-rates/#axzz1mReC6f54.
155
Id.
156
However, one could argue that the lending market is competitive, and presumably the economics
of supply and demand will regulate any possibilities of excessive rates.
157
Strochak, supra note 154.
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If not the market for debtor-in-possession financing, then what should
courts look to in establishing an efficient market rate? One possible
alternative would be to equate an efficient market with any comparable
market loan, as is done in the coerced loan approach. However, this
approach is not without its own problems. There may not always be an
actual efficient market for a particular cramdown loan.158 A particular
comparable loan may not be available for many reasons, including the
tightening of the credit market or the lack of any comparable business
structured in the same manner as the debtor.159 One commentator believes
“[t]here is no more of a ‘free market of willing cramdown lenders’ in a
chapter 11 . . . than in a chapter 13.”160 If there is a lending market, then
“there is no need to resort to a cramdown provision.”161 Other possible
problems associated with this interpretation of an efficient market may be
traced to the problems found in the coerced loan approach as discussed
above, which include (1) the loan proposed is “so outrageous that no
rational lender would make [a similar loan]”162 or (2) “the market may have
shrunk for loans of the type proposed.”163
Ultimately, the problem with the efficient market approach is the
elusive definition of an efficient market. There does not appear to be a clear
answer. Regrettably, “[t]he definition of an efficient market has not been
directly addressed by a post-Till case.”164 Several of the post-Till cases
mentioned above exhibit instances of how difficult it is to find an applicable
efficient market rate.165 The party attempting to establish the efficient
market rate “is left to speculate what evidentiary considerations will be
required to establish an efficient market and what this evidentiary endeavor
will cost.”166
It is ultimately up to the bankruptcy judge to weigh the evidence and
determine whether an efficient market exists. Where there is no actual
efficient market, there is, of course, no applicable efficient market interest
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See Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient, Inc.),
420 F.3d 559, 567‒68 (6th Cir. 2005).
159
See In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 189 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (“[A]s Judge Lundin articulated in the
chapter 11 context in In re Aztec Company . . . it is difficult to arrive at a current market rate of interest
for a hypothetical new loan when there is no market for the loan proposed, no equity in the property and
limited opportunity on the part of the debtor to obtain financing outside of the Bankruptcy Code
framework.”).
160
Thomas J. Yerbich, How Do You Count the Votes—Or Did Till Tilt the Game?, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., July/Aug. 2004, at 10, 59.
161
Id.
162
7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][ii][B], at 1129-152.
163
Id.
164
Pill, supra note 3, at 290.
165
See supra Part III.C.
166
Pill, supra note 3, at 288‒89.
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rate. It seems that courts and practitioners alike will continue to wrestle
with the proper definition of efficient market.
V. THE CONTRACT RATE APPROACH—A BETTER WAY
This Comment argues that there is a better way to determine an
appropriate Chapter 11 cramdown rate. Namely, the court should apply a
contract rate approach by looking at the interest rate of the original
agreement between the parties, rather than applying Till’s formula approach
or the efficient market approach.
Under the contract rate approach, courts apply the prepetition contract
rate on the presumption that the prebankruptcy contract interest rate on the
loan is an accurate reflection of the lending market.167 The contract rate “is
generally a good indicator of actual risk, . . . and it will provide a quick and
reasonably accurate standard”168 for determining a cramdown rate. To be
clear, the contract rate approach differs from the aforementioned
presumptive contract approach in that it will not allow the parties to rebut
the negotiated contract rate. One principal reason why the contract rate
approach does not include a rebuttal element is the significant evidentiary
burden (including discovery) and cost associated with rebuttal. As
suggested by Till’s plurality, the debtor-in-possession must spend
considerable resources to obtain sufficient information, such as the
creditor’s overhead costs and lending practices, to rebut the presumptive
contract rate.169 In addition, another difficulty is in establishing a clear
standard for the rebuttal, which is beyond the scope of this Comment. Even
then, I question how much information is needed to persuade the court to
rebut the presumptive contract rate.
Applying a contract rate approach raises various obvious questions,
namely, why not stick with Till’s formula approach or the efficient market
approach? The Supreme Court adopted the formula approach, so is the
contract rate approach inconsistent with the Court’s mandate? Why should
the courts apply the contract rate approach over the formula and efficient
market approaches?
As I argued above, Till’s plurality opinion is not binding on lower
courts in regard to Chapter 11 cramdown situations.170 Other than the
Justices who joined the plurality opinion, no Justice discussed the
applicability of Till to Chapter 11 cramdown situations. The plurality did
suggest that an efficient market analysis should apply to Chapter 11
cramdowns,171 but it failed to provide a workable definition of efficient
167
168
169
170
171

See supra Part II.C.
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 492 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 478 (plurality opinion).
See supra Part III.B. There should be no doubt that Till is binding on Chapter 13 debtors.
See Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14.
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market. Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, did point to the
availability of debtor-in-possession financing as evidence of a “free market
of willing cramdown lenders.”172 However, as discussed above, there are
several reasons why the debtor-in-possession financing market is not
necessarily an appropriate efficient market for cramdown purposes.173
Consequently, the efficient market approach offers no solution to the
Chapter 11 cramdown dilemma.
Accordingly, we must address the issue of why the contract rate
approach is preferable to the formula and efficient market approaches. The
proposed contract rate approach is superior for three reasons. First, the
contract rate approach best protects the justified expectations of the parties.
Second, the basic policies and interests underlying the laws of Chapter 11
and Chapter 13 bankruptcies are different. Bankrupt corporations (Chapter
11) are not the same as bankrupt individuals (Chapter 13). Considering the
various interests of a Chapter 11 corporation, there are strong arguments
why a contract rate approach is more suitable. Third, both the formula and
the efficient market approaches are excessively complicated, requiring risk
premium calculations and efficient market determinations. The contract rate
approach is easier to manage and creates consistent, predictable outcomes.
A. Justified Expectations of the Parties
Applying a contract rate approach will protect the justified
expectations of both the creditor and debtor-in-possession. Generally, “it
would be unfair and improper” to hold the creditor to a new interest rate
“when he had justifiably molded his conduct to conform” to the demands of
a competitive lending market.174 Parties enter a transaction with the
expectation that each side will satisfy their duties and obligations, and
creditors expect a certain amount of compensation from their loans.175 A
desire to protect justified expectations is one key factor underlying the
relatively broad freedom the law gives contracting parties to choose what
type of debt they wish to incur.176
Without protection of their justified expectations, parties are likely to
change their borrowing and lending behaviors, which would create a ripple
172

Id.
See supra Part IV.C.
174
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. g (1971) (noting that the
“[p]rotection of justified expectations . . . is an important value in all fields of the law” (emphasis
omitted)).
175
Likewise, it can be argued that creditors know, or should know, that their loans may be rewritten
in bankruptcy. However, whether the creditor accounts for this risk is uncertain.
176
Cf. KERMIT ROOSEVELT, III, CONFLICT OF LAWS 82 (2010) (listing protection of the justified
expectations of the parties as a relevant factor in the choice of law determination for contracts issues);
see also Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate LockUps, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 33 (1999) (“The principal purpose of contract law is to protect the justified
expectations that arise from promises underlying bargains.”).
173
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effect throughout the economy.177 For example, if cramdown creditors are
“systematically undercompensated,” lenders will offset their losses with
higher rates or simply decline to lend money to the riskiest debtors.178 Such
an arrangement would, of course, be suboptimal. The recent credit crunch
serves as a concrete illustration of the importance of credit availability.
Restricting access to credit ultimately decreases the amount of investment
in business, education, and housing—all vital components of the greater
public interest of economic growth. Protecting justified expectations and
applying a contract rate approach would ensure that lenders are adequately
protected, enhancing the lending market and potentially resulting in lower
interest rates.179
B. Underlying Policies and Interests of Bankruptcy
An assessment of the policies and interests underlying Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings justifies choosing a contract rate approach. The
fundamental goals of Chapter 11 bankruptcies are to provide a fresh start
and to protect the rights of creditors.180 However, in the Chapter 11 context,
it is debatable whether a debtor-in-possession’s fresh start is more
important than the rights of creditors.181
In Till, the Court, in supporting the formula approach, focused on the
debtor’s fresh start and minimizing costs in Chapter 13 cases. Most Chapter
13 debtors or individuals can ill afford to handle costly disputes.182
Individual debtors are also not as well versed in the legal and financial
ramifications of bankruptcy.183 These rationales, although still present in
some Chapter 11 bankruptcies, are certainly not a main concern in larger
Chapter 11 cases.184 Corporations (filing under Chapter 11) tend to have
more resources, such as legal and finance departments, that allow them to
obtain better knowledge and an understanding of the potential risks
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See Till, 541 U.S. at 508 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
179
This section presents a strong argument against applying an efficient market rate, which may
produce a new cramdown interest rate that neither party expected prepetition.
180
See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1100.01, at 1100-4.
181
See Ralph Brubaker, Taking Exception to the New Corporate Discharge Exceptions, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 757, 760‒61 (2005) (discussing why giving the corporate debtor a “fresh start”
might not be the principal policy concern in Chapter 11 bankruptcies).
182
See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][i].
183
Chapter 13 debtors are assigned a Chapter 13 trustee. The trustee is considered the representative
of the Chapter 13 estate. In United States trustee districts, the United States trustee, rather than the court,
makes the appointment of an individual to serve as standing Chapter 13 trustee, or as trustee in a
particular case, or else the United States trustee may serve as the Chapter 13 trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 323
(2006); 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2006).
184
See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][i], at 1129-148 (“[The cost-minimizing]
rationale, while not absent from chapter 11 cases, is certainly minimized in larger chapter 11 cases.”).
178
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associated with debt.185 For instance, a Chapter 11 corporation is arguably
better at understanding the consequences of negotiating a subprime
mortgage with high variable rates—and therefore needs less protection—
than a Chapter 13 individual debtor.
It would be unjustified to treat Chapter 11 debtors-in-possession the
same as Chapter 13 debtors. The contract rate approach does not, per se, tilt
the balance in favor of the debtor or creditor. Rather, it seeks to preserve the
equitable balance between debtors and creditors that existed prior to
bankruptcy.
C. Ease of Management, Uniformity, and Predictability
Ease of management, uniformity, and predictability are values
desirable across a wide range of legal fields.186 Bankruptcy law is no
exception. It is important that good rules be developed to reaffirm these
values. A contract rate approach is simply more straightforward than the
formula and efficient market approaches because it is easier to apply and
more objective. As Justice Scalia stated in his Till dissent, a contract rate
provides a good indication of the actual risk of default in the particular
case.187 The cramdown rate is already predetermined by the contract rate, “a
number readily found in the loan document.”188 Moreover, a contract rate
approach would make the cramdown process more objective and uniform
by eliminating the subjective elements found in both the formula approach
and the efficient market approach.189 Courts will no longer have to ponder
whether, for example, a 1% or 4% risk adjustment is adequate and feasible
for the debtor.190 The parties will also no longer have to wait and wonder
how the bankruptcy court will rule concerning the existence of an efficient
market. Additionally, the predictability afforded by the contract rate
approach will lower lending risks and enable lenders to appropriately
evaluate the debt market.
Finally, another potential benefit of using the contract rate approach is
a reduction of the number and complexity of evidentiary hearings and
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I imagine corporate bankruptcies tend to implicate larger concerns of economic welfare, such as
productivity and market stability, whereas individual bankruptcies often highlight social policies such as
the prevention of homelessness and the protection of the common person.
186
See ROOSEVELT, supra note 176, at 82.
187
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 492 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188
Id. at 499.
189
See Greenspan & Nelson, supra note 36, at 70 (arguing that although the factors the Till plurality
used to find the appropriate formula approach risk adjustment are arguably objectively observable in the
market, it nonetheless “takes subjective professional judgment to apply [them] to each debtor’s
circumstances”).
190
See id. (“[I]n noting that courts ‘have generally approved 1‒3 percent’ as the proper risk
adjustment, Till will inevitably, and perhaps inappropriately, frame discussions as to the range of this
adjustment.” (citations omitted) (quoting Till, 541 U.S. at 480 (plurality opinion))).
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expensive discovery associated with the formula and efficient market
approaches.191
CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to shed light on the difficulty of choosing
an appropriate cramdown interest rate to apply to a creditor’s claim in the
Chapter 11 context. With the Supreme Court’s decision in Till v. SCS
Credit Corp. serving as a backdrop, courts are still struggling to reach a
consensus in Chapter 11 cases. The Till Court described the many benefits
and problems with each approach,192 but ultimately decided on the formula
approach as the appropriate method for determining the cramdown rate for
secured claims in Chapter 13.
The import of Till’s holding to Chapter 11 cases is not yet clear.
Although Till’s plurality hinted at a desire for uniformity among various
chapters of the Bankruptcy Code,193 footnote fourteen of the opinion has
caused confusion for practitioners, litigants, and courts alike. Both because
Till’s reasoning did not garner a majority and because of the peculiarities of
footnote fourteen, one is left to wonder whether even a majority of the Till
Court would apply its holding to Chapter 11.
Since Till, some courts have applied Till’s formula approach,194
whereas other courts have found footnote fourteen persuasive and have
created new approaches to take into account the possibility of an efficient
market analysis.195 To address the issue of which approach should be used
in Chapter 11 cases, this Comment has advocated the implementation of
neither the formula nor efficient market approaches, but, instead, a contract
rate approach.
This Comment has established that the contract rate approach is
superior for several reasons. First, the contract will allow the court to apply
an objective approach that can eliminate the uncertainty involved in
establishing a risk premium under the formula approach or an efficient
market under the efficient market approach. Second, this Comment has
showed that the contract rate approach protects the justified expectations of
191

Cf. In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 847 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) (“Determination of an appropriate
rate is a difficult question because unlike a lending institution, this Court does not have a lending manual
which mechanically guides this analysis.”). Moreover, a debtor-in-possession attempting to establish an
efficient market has the burden of obtaining information on the creditor’s lending practice, costs of
overhead, financial circumstances, and more. See Pill, supra note 3, at 188‒89.
192
See Till, 541 U.S. 465. A reading of Till suggests a lack of satisfactory reasoning for any of the
many approaches suggested.
193
E.g., id. at 474 (“Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow essentially the
same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate under any of these provisions.”).
194
See In re Prussia Assocs., 322 B.R. 572, 590 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005).
195
See Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient, Inc.),
420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005); Mercury Capital Corp. v. Milford Conn. Assocs., L.P., 354 B.R. 1, 13
(D. Conn. 2006); In re Nw. Timberline Enters., Inc., 348 B.R. 412, 432 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
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the parties and the underlying policies of the Bankruptcy Code. And finally,
the contract rate approach is easier to manage and instills predictability and
uniformity in an area of law that has generally lacked both. As a whole, the
benefits of the contract rate approach outweigh those of all the other
alternatives. For these reasons, courts should adopt the contract rate
approach when dealing with Chapter 11 cramdowns.
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